COMMENTS

Voluntariness of Confessions in Habeas
Corpus Proceedings: The Proper Standard
for Appellate Review
Keith R. Dollivert

The body of a young girl is found in a cemetery, her head
crushed and much of her clothing removed.1 Two days later, police
officers interview a suspect at the home he shares with his mother.
The suspect agrees to accompany the officers to the station, where
questioning begins after the police require the suspect to wait two
hours in an office. Following extensive questioning, a police officer
suggests that the suspect submit to a polygraph test, and the suspect agrees.
,Upon completion of the initial polygraph test, the examiner
informs the suspect that he has reason to believe that the suspect
is lying and questions him further. At this point the suspect confesses orally to the murder. A police officer is brought into the
room, and, after waiving a reading of the Miranda warnings, the
suspect again confesses to the murder and signs a written statement indicating that he killed the girl by running over her with his
car after she refused to have sex with him.
At trial, the defendant objects to the introduction of his written confession into evidence, alleging that the examiner lied about
the results of the initial polygraph test to intimidate him into confessing to the murder. The trial court admits the written confest B.A. 1985, Swarthmore College; J.D. Candidate 1990, The University of Chicago.
I This set of facts is based on Sotelo v Indiana State Prison, 850 F2d 1244, 1245-46
(7th Cir 1988). See also Sotelo v State of Indiana, 264 Ind 298, 342 NE2d 844 (1976).
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sion over the defendant's objections, and the defendant is convicted of first degree murder. On appeal to the state supreme
court, both the verdict and the trial court's admission of the confession are affirmed.
Thirteen years later, the defendant files a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus under 28 USC § 2254 in federal district court. The
district court, following the Supreme Court's decision in Miller v
Fenton,2 conducts a de novo review of the defendant's claim that
his confession was involuntary. After this plenary review, the district court denies the petition. The defendant then appeals the district court's decision to the federal court of appeals.'
At this point, the court of appeals will probably follow the
lead of the other circuits and conduct an additional de novo review.4 Like the other circuits, it will reason that the Supreme
Court's decision in Miller v Fenton requires both federal district
courts and courts of appeals to conduct de novo review of the voluntariness of a confession when a habeas corpus petition claims
that the state court admitted an improperly obtained confession
into evidence.
Despite the unanimity of the circuits on this issue, it is doubtful that Miller does in fact mandate de novo review of the
voluntariness issue in the federal appellate courts. Neither the rationale for de novo review of voluntariness at the district level, the
objectives of § 2254, nor the directives of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 52(a), compels de novo review at the appellate level. In
short, the appellate courts' interpretation of their role in reviewing
the voluntariness question in habeas cases seems to "reflect[]
neither the considerations motivating Miller nor those underlying
the division of responsibilities between trial and appellate courts."' 5
2

474 US 104 (1985).

1 So far there have been three separate judicial inquiries into the voluntariness of the
defendant's confession: two by the state courts and one by the federal district court. See
Sotelo, 850 F2d at 1246 n 1. States with intermediate appellate courts may provide three
opportunities for such inquiry.
" See Green v Scully, 850 F2d 894, 900 (2d Cir 1988); Miller v Fenton, 796 F2d 598, 601
(3d Cir 1986); United States v Hawkins, 823 F2d 1020, 1022-23 (7th Cir 1987); and United
States v Wauneka, 842 F2d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir 1988). But see Carr v Henderson, 385 F2d
531, 532 (6th Cir 1967) (voluntariness of a confession in habeas proceedings reviewed under
the "clearly erroneous" standard). Note that Carr was decided eighteen years before the
Supreme Court's decision in Miller.
1 Sotelo v Indiana State Prison, 850 F2d 1244, 1253 (7th Cir 1988) (Easterbrook concurring). Judge Easterbrook's argument is based largely on the notion that appellate review
of the voluntariness issue would be inefficient. Id at 1254. See also Wilson v O'Leary, No 892085, slip op at 8 (7th Cir, February 7, 1990). Inefficiency has been frequently decried by the
Supreme Court in other areas of appellate review of factual issues. See Anderson v Besse-
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This Comment argues thatthe Supreme Court has not mandated de novo appellate review of a district court's finding on the
voluntariness of a confession. After reviewing the law of voluntariness of confessions and the federal habeas corpus statute, the
Comment focuses on the case that seems most strongly to urge de
novo appellate review, Miller v Fenton. Because Miller was concerned not with ensuring de novo review of voluntariness generally,
but with securing federal de novo review of this significant constitutional interest, district court de novo review seems sufficient.
From this clarification of Miller, the Comment turns to an examination of the "constitutional fact" doctrine, on which Miller's
holding may have been based. Concluding that this doctrine has
been inconsistently applied by the Court and has rarely mandated
review at all judicial levels, the Comment suggests that the constitutional fact doctrine does not control whether appellate courts
must review the voluntariness question de novo. Instead, the appellate courts should treat district court findings on voluntariness
as findings of fact under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) and
review them under the "clearly erroneous" standard.
Since the federal appellate courts are not required to conduct
plenary review of the voluntariness issue under either the constitutional fact doctrine or Rule 52(a), any decision to conduct discretionary review should consider other factors that weigh against de
novo review in habeas corpus cases. This Comment examines two
such factors: efficiency concerns and the legislative history of the
statute. Efficiency recommends that the courts of appeals avoid de
novo review of voluntariness and rely instead on the de novo findings of the district courts, which are best suited and accustomed to
such searching inquiries. The legislative history underlying the
1966 amendment to the habeas corpus statute, while not directly
touching on the issue of appellate review, generally supports the
efficiency argument. The purpose of that amendment was to ensure the efficient review of habeas corpus petitions in the federal
courts. Thus, absent any mandate or other justification to conduct
de novo review at the appellate level, the circuit courts' current
commitment to de novo review is unwarranted and should be rejected in favor of review under the clearly erroneous standard.

mer City, 470 US 564, 574-75 (1985); Pullman-Standard v Swint, 456 US 273, 290-93
(1982); and text at notes 83-97.
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BACKGROUND: VOLUNTARINESS OF CONFESSIONS AND HABEAS
CORPUS

A. The Voluntariness Test
Whether upon direct appeal or review of a habeas corpus petition, the inquiry into the voluntariness of a confession is a notoriously difficult process. In Culombe v Connecticut,' the Supreme
Court observed that the inquiry into the voluntariness of a confession involves several elements. First, the basic historical facts surrounding the confession at issue must be established. Second, the
court must determine if the defendant's mental state was such that

the decision to confess could be considered voluntary. Finally, the
court must apply the proper legal rule to the findings reached in
the previous steps to determine if the7 confession was voluntary for
purposes of the Due Process Clause.
The legal rule set forth in Culombe mandates a two-pronged
judicial inquiry. The first prong requires the court to determine
whether the confession was a product of the defendant's free will,
or whether the defendant's will was "overborne" by law enforcement or other government officials.8 The second prong, accorded
equal weight by the Court, asks whether the system of interrogation employed by the State is "so inherently coercive that its very
existence is irreconcilable with the possession of mental freedom
by a lone suspect," regardless of whether there is reason to believe
that the defendant's will was in fact overborne.9 Confessions must
therefore meet both conditions or be found to violate the defendant's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.
The voluntariness test set forth by the Supreme Court requires an extensive investigation of factual issues concerning both
the defendant's mental state and the methods used by law enforcement officials to extract the confession. 10 Courts making a
6 367 US 568 (1961).
Id at 603. The standard of voluntariness is a question of law, and hence reviewable de
novo under Rule 52(a). See text at note 96.
8 Id at 602.
" Gallegos v Colorado, 370 US 49, 52 (1962) (quoting Ashcraft v Tennessee, 322 US
143, 154 (1944)).
10 In Miranda v State of Arizona, 384 US 436, 478-79 (1966), the Court took a step
toward simplifying this "hybrid" voluntariness test, holding that if police failed to fully
inform a suspect both of his right to remain silent and his right to counsel, the courts were
to conclude that the confession was involuntary and bar its admission into evidence. Yet the
Court failed to make a complete break with the traditional voluntariness test, stating that
even if the police had given the new Miranda warnings, lower courts could still find the
confession involuntary under the old "due process" test of Culombe. Miranda, 384 US at
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voluntariness finding are thus required to expend significant resources reviewing the factual record surrounding the confession
and determining whether the defendant's confession should be admitted as a voluntary, self-incriminating statement. That trial
courts must make this investment is undisputed. Whether federal
appellate courts must also engage in this complex inquiry depends
upon the appropriate standard of review of lower court findings on
voluntariness.
B. Appellate Review of Voluntariness
While the Supreme Court has established this two-pronged
voluntariness test for the lower courts, it has never clarified how
appellate courts should treat findings made by trial courts under
the test. A factor undoubtedly clouding the appellate courts' understanding of their responsibilities is that the Supreme Court itself has conducted de novo review of voluntariness in a good number of cases. Many in the string of confession cases culminating in
Miranda v Arizona" involved de novo review of confessions, 2 and
Miranda itself can be understood as an effort by the Court to develop a clear rule that would free it from case-by-case determinations of voluntariness. 13
Yet in holding that it was free to subject state court findings
on the voluntariness of confessions to plenary review in both direct
appeals from state courts and in habeas proceedings, the Court did
not determine what standard is appropriate for circuit courts reviewing federal district court findings. The failure of the Court to
clarify this issue may have resulted from a number of factors. It is
apparent from a review of the factual circumstances of the Court's
476. Indeed, to the extent that law enforcement officials use the Miranda warnings as standard procedure, lower courts will frequently resort to the traditional voluntariness test.
Moreover, in post-Miranda decisions, the Court has retreated from the position that the
absence of the Mirandawarnings would constitute conclusive proof that a defendant's confession was involuntary. See Michigan v Tucker, 417 US 433 (1974); New York v Quarles,
467 US 649 (1984); and Oregon v Elstad, 470 US 298 (1985). Thus, both because the police
now routinely give Miranda warnings, and because the absence of such warnings is not conclusive proof of involuntariness, the courts have been forced back to the clumsy "due process" voluntariness test. As the Supreme Court itself has noted, "the Court has continued to
measure confessions against the requirements of due process." Miller, 474 US at 110.
" 384 US 436 (1966).
1 See, for example, Haynes v State of Washington, 373 US 503 (1963).
13 See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Confessions and the Court, 79 Mich L Rev 865, 869-70
(1981) (noting among the difficulties of the pre-Miranda regime that "when higher courts
did attempt to address confessions questions, they found themselves so wholly at sea that
the appearance of principled judicial decision-making inevitably suffered, whether or not
they chose to hold the confession inadmissible").
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pre-Miranda confession cases that state courts had upheld convictions based on confessions obtained through plainly egregious law
enforcement practices, methods which might well be considered
physical and mental torture.14 As a result, the Court was primarily
concerned with establishing a baseline constitutional standard for
state law enforcement methods. The Court was therefore interested in ensuring plenary federal review of state court findings on
this important constitutional issue, not in determining how federal
district court findings should be treated by the federal appellate
courts. 15 In fact, most cases discussing the importance of federal

review of voluntariness of confessions were taken directly from
state supreme courts on writs of certiorari, and as a result the Supreme Court was the only federal court to consider the voluntariness issue. Thus, the allocation of adjudicative authority within the
federal system was not at issue.' 6 Neither was the efficient processing of habeas petitions by the federal courts at issue, since the
Court had not yet experienced the "explosion" of habeas corpus
petitions that occurred in the 1960s.' 7 Moreover, as discussed in
section III, the Court's decision to use its discretion to review findings of fact related to constitutional rights does not automatically
indicate a mandate to the circuit courts to do the same.
The Supreme Court, then, has sanctioned de novo review by at
least one federal court of state court findings on the voluntariness
question. Yet, as will be shown in section II, the Court has not
mandated that federal appellate courts conduct de novo review of
district court findings on voluntariness. The de novo standard may
be appropriate for federal review of state court decisions, but it
does not follow that federal appellate courts are also bound to it
once the need for independent federal review has been satisfied.
C. The Habeas Corpus Statute
The writ of habeas corpus-the "Great Writ"' 5-lies at the
core of American notions of liberty and due process. The Framers
See, for example, Watts v Indiana, 338 US 49, 52-53 (1949) (suspect kept in solitary
confinement for six days with no place to sit or sleep except the floor, and purposely denied
sleep by extensive police interrogation).
11 See Ashcraft, 322 US at 155 ("The Constitution stands as a bar against the conviction of any individual in an American court by means of a coerced confession."). See also
Watts, 338 US at 55.
" See, for example, Watts, 338 US at 50; Culombe, 367 US at 570.
17 On this growth, see text at note 98.
11 See, for example, Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction v United States Marshals Service, 474 US 34, 39 n 5 (1985).
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of the Constitution affirmed its sanctity by requiring that Congress
provide a means by which citizens could avail themselves of it in
the federal courts. 19 The writ as we know it today has its origins in
the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 ("the Act"), which explicitly authorized the federal courts to issue writs of habeas corpus "in all
cases where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in
violation of the Constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United
States."2 0 Additionally, the Act empowered a federal court reviewing a habeas corpus petition to disregard the conclusions of the
state court and take testimony and determine the facts of the case
for itself.2
The current federal habeas statute, 28 USC § 2254, grants the
federal courts authority to review petitions for the writ of habeas
corpus from "person(s) in custody pursuant to the judgment of a
State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of
the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States."" The
statute further provides that habeas corpus petitions shall not be
granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted all remedies available in the state courts, or evidence exists either of an
absence of appeal procedures, or that such procedures would for
some reason be ineffective to protect the rights of the petitioner.2 3
Thus, federal courts cannot intervene to correct state court actions
until the state's judicial system has had a full opportunity to consider and correct any flaws.
Requiring exhaustion of state remedies is not the only method
by which Congress has sought to limit federal review of state court
proceedings. Significant concern arose in the 1960s that the writ's
importance and legitimacy would be diluted through abuse. In
1966, Congress responded to this sentiment by adding a new subsection to the habeas corpus statute:
[A] determination after a hearing on the merits of a factual
issue, made by a State court of competent jurisdiction in a
1' "The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in
Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public safety may require it." US Const, Art I, § 9, cl 2.
See also Ex Parte Bollman, 8 US (4 Cranch) 75 (1807).
20 14 Stat 385, 385 (1867). The availability of the federal writ to state prisoners did not
fully develop until the middle of the nineteenth century. Prior to the 1867 act, Congress had
twice passed legislation giving the federal courts the authority in particular situations to
exert jurisdiction by writ of habeas corpus over prisoners held by the states. See 4 Stat 633,
634 (1833) (habeas corpus for citizens confined by state for acts taken in pursuance of federal law); 5 Stat 539 (1842) (habeas corpus for foreign nationals held by state or federal
government).
21

14 Stat 385, 386 (1867).

22

28 USC § 2254(a) (1982).
28 USC § 2254(b) (1982).

23
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proceeding to which the applicant for the writ [of habeas
corpus] and the State... were parties, evidenced by a written
finding, written opinion, or other reliable and adequate written indicia, shall be presumed to be correct . *...24
Thus, with certain exceptions noted in the statute,2 5 the federal
courts must presume that state court findings of fact are correct.
Congress's amendment to the Act accorded with prior Supreme Court reasoning. Just three years before the amendment, in
Townsend v Sain, the Court had established the principle that
federal courts should presume the correctness of state court findings on factual issues.2 In that case, the Court found that the state
court had failed to compile a record adequate to support its finding
that the confession at issue was voluntary; however, the Court observed that when a habeas corpus applicant had been afforded a
full and fair hearing in the state court, the federal courts should
ordinarily "accept the facts found" in the state proceeding.2 It is
clear that Congress recognized the benefits of this view and thus
simply chose to "elevate[] [the Court's] exhortation into a
28
mandatory presumption of correctness.
II. MILLER V FENTON AND FEDERAL APPELLATE REVIEW OF
VOLUNTARINESS

Although in § 2254(d) Congress directed the federal courts to
accept findings of fact made by the state courts, it did not clarify
which aspects of a state court finding are "fact" and which are
"law" for purposes of the statute. 29 Thus, the statute did not make
Pub L No 89-711, 80 Stat 1105 (1966), codified at 28 USC § 2254(d) (1982).
26 The eight exceptions are: (1) the merits of the case were not resolved in the state
proceeding; (2) the state court's fact-finding procedure was flawed; (3) material facts were
not adequately developed in the state hearing; (4) the state court lacked jurisdiction; (5) the
state failed to appoint counsel for an indigent petitioner; (6) the applicant did not receive a
full, fair hearing; (7) the applicant was other.wise denied due process; or (8) the record does
not fairly support the finding of the state court. 28 USC § 2254(d) (1)-(8).
26 372 US 293, 318 (1963). The Court recognized that this portion of the federal habeas
corpus statute was taken from Townsend. See Miller, 474 US at 111.
24

27
28

Townsend, 372 US at 318.
Miller, 474 US at 111-12.

29 Prior to its decision in Miller, the Court had on a number of occasions upheld the
application of the § 2254(d) presumption of correctness to findings reached by the state
courts. See, for example, the following cases cited in Miller, 474 US at 112-13: Wainwright v
Witt, 469 US 412, 426-30 (1985) (trial court determination that a prospective juror in a
capital case was properly excluded); Patton v Yount, 467 US 1025, 1036-40 (1984)
(impartiality of an individual juror); Rushen v Spain, 464 US 114, 120 (1983) (effect of ex
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clear how a court should categorize a state court's finding on the
voluntariness of a confession. That question was presented in
Miller v Fenton. In Miller, the Third Circuit had affirmed a district court's denial of a petition for habeas corpus by a man convicted of murder in a New Jersey state court. At his trial, the defendant had moved to exclude evidence of his confession on the
theory that his confession had been coerced.30 The trial court rejected the defendant's motion, and its decision was ultimately upheld by the New Jersey Supreme Court. The defendant then
sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court, but the
court dismissed the application. The Third Circuit affirmed. Both
courts held that the issue of voluntariness was a question of fact
under 28 USC § 2254(d) and that the federal inquiry was "limited
to determining whether the state court applied the proper legal
test, and whether [its] factual conclusions... [were] supported on
the record as a whole."3 1
On certiorari, the Supreme Court rejected this reading of the
statute, holding that the state court finding on the voluntariness of
a confession was not a finding of fact entitled to deference under
the federal habeas corpus statute. The Court reasoned that the issues raised in an involuntary confession claim pose important due
process concerns,3 2 and concluded that "the ultimate question
whether .

.

. the challenged confession was obtained in a manner

compatible with the requirements of the Constitution is a matter
for independent federal determination." 33
At no point in its opinion did the Court address whether a
federal appellate court should defer to a federal district court's
findings on that issue. Rather, it based its decision on the need for
an "independent federal determination" of issues, like voluntariness, that are intertwined with the constitutional due process
rights guaranteed against the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. As the Court stated at the close of its opinion:
parte communication on impartiality of individual juror); Maggio v Fulford, 462 US 111, 113
(1983) (competency to stand trial); Marshall v Lonberger, 459 US 422, 432-35 (1983) (determination that defendant received and understood sufficient notice of charges against him to
render guilty plea voluntary).
3o Miller, 474 US at 108. The defendant claimed that the police officers had lied when
interrogating him-telling him that he had been identified as the assailant by the victim
and others-and had sought to gain his confidence by telling him that they didn't believe he
was a "criminal" and that he needed psychological help, not punishment. Id at 106-07.
' Miller, 741 F2d 1456, 1462 (3d Cir 1984), rev'd and remanded, 474 US 104 (1985).
3, Miller, 474 US at 109-16.
33 Id at 112 (emphasis added).
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We reiterate our confidence that state judges, no less than
their federal counterparts, will properly discharge their duty
to protect the constitutional rights of criminal defendants. We
note only that in the confession context, independent federal
review had traditionally played an important parallel role in
protecting the rights at stake when the prosecution secures a
conviction through the defendant's own admissions. 4
In considering the precedential force of the Court's opinion in
Miller, it is important to keep in mind the specific question at issue in the case. Because the district court and the Third Circuit
had both deferred to the state court's finding, no federal court had
considered the constitutional questions raised by the petitioner's
involuntary confession claim by the time the case reached the Supreme Court. The Court's emphasis, then, was on establishing that
the federal courts as a body should not defer to state court findings on voluntariness of confessions, given the long-standing federal interest in the voluntariness question.3 5
In considering the voluntariness of confessions, the Court has
sought to protect criminal defendants from two related evils: abusive law enforcement methods that undermine their due process
rights and criminal justice systems that deny their free will.
Miller's guarantee of de novo review in a federal forum alleviates
these concerns by -providing independent protection to constitutional rights.
But in order for the Supreme Court to permit federal courts to
disregard state court findings, it had to circumvent the troublesome problem that its own jurisprudence and 28 USC § 2254(d)
required federal court deference to state court findings of fact. The
solution, a semantic one, was to conclude that voluntariness was
not a "fact" under the statute.
In interpreting the statute, the Court found that it should be
construed in light of the Court's prior holding in Townsend v Sain,
from which Congress had drawn the language of § 2254(d). In
Townsend, the Court had made a distinction between ordinary
facts and the "ultimate constitutional question" of whether a confession was voluntary.38 The Miller Court held that this distinction
was inherent in the statute, and that §2254(d) incorporated the
holding in Townsend and other cases that "the ultimate question
31Id at 117-18.
"

See Sotelo, 850 F2d at 1254 (Easterbrook concurring).

" Townsend, 372 US at 309 & n 6.
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of the admissibility of a confession merits treatment as a legal in'
quiry requiring plenary federal review." 37
The circuit courts have read Miller to hold that a court's findings on the voluntariness of a confession, given the constitutional
issues involved, are not ordinary findings of fact, but are of special
importance and merit "independent consideration in a federal
habeas corpus proceeding.""8 They therefore conduct an independent inquiry into district court findings on voluntariness. Yet even
if we accept that the Court has drawn a distinction between ordinary factual issues and "ultimate constitutional questions," it is
not clear that this distinction requires federal appellate courts to
conduct de novo review of district court findings of the latter sort.

III.
A.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL FACT DOCTRINE AND APPELLATE REVIEw

The Constitutional Fact Doctrine

If the circuit courts of appeals are correct in binding themselves to de novo review of district court findings on voluntariness,
one justification that leaps to mind immediately is the "constitutional fact" doctrine.3 9 The foremost example of the doctrine is
Bose Corp. v Consumers Union of United States, Inc.,4 ° where the
Court stated that the First Amendment principles at issue in a defamation action brought in federal district court required both the
appellate court and the Supreme Court to conduct de novo review
of the district court's finding as to "actual malice." Although malice was admittedly a question of fact, the Court found that "the
clearly-erroneous standard of Rule 52(a) ... does not prescribe the
standard of review to be applied in reviewing a determination of
actual malice." 4' Because a finding of "actual malice" involves constitutional principles, the Court held that reviewing courts had to
give plenary consideration to the issue.4 2
37

Miller, 474 US at 115.

33 Id.
3' The Court's opinion in Miller v Fenton does not invoke the "constitutional fact"
doctrine as a basis of its decision; thus, the Court has never explicitly stated that the doctrine applies to review of district court findings on the voluntariness of confessions. This
may, however, have more to do with the fact that Justice O'Connor, who joined in Justice
Rehnquist's dissent in Bose Corp. v Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 US 485
(1984) (see text at note 44), authored the majority opinion in Miller than with any specific
desire of the Court to avoid designating the voluntariness of confessions a "constitutional
fact."

40 466 US 485 (1984).
41 Id at 514.
42 The Court made similar distinctions between "ordinary" and "constitutional" facts
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The "constitutional fact" doctrine has been sharply criticized
as an improvident attempt by the Court to ensure accuracy in the
determination of constitutional rights without recognizing the
enormous potential strain the doctrine could place on judicial resources.43 Perhaps the strongest critique of the doctrine has come
from Chief Justice Rehnquist, who dissented in Bose Corp. While
accepting the majority's claims that First Amendment rights
needed careful protection, then-Justice Rehnquist argued:
Because it is not clear to me that the de novo findings of appellate courts ... are likely to be any more reliable than the
findings reached by trial judges, I cannot join the majority's
sanctioning of factual second-guessing by appellate courts. I
believe that the primary result of the Court's holding today
will not be greater protection for First Amendment values,
but rather only lessened confidence in the judgments of lower
courts and more entirely factbound appeals."'
The application of the constitutional fact doctrine to issues
beyond those involved in Bose Corp. remains unclear. The Court
has come nowhere near requiring de novo review for all lower court
findings involving constitutional rights. Indeed, whereas the Court
held in Bose Corp. that the importance of the First Amendment
required the federal appellate courts to review de novo lower court
findings of actual malice,4 5 the Court appears to have rejected the
''constitutional fact" doctrine in another important area of First
Amendment law, holding that the adjudicative authority to determine obscenity must be left with the trial courts.4 6
Other constitutional rights have been excepted altogether
from this special review. In Illinois v Gates,47 for example, the
Court observed that Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable search and seizure did not require the Court to conduct
in cases pre-dating Bose Corp., holding that plenary appellate review of such constitutional
facts is appropriate. See, for example, Cox v Louisiana, 379 US 536, 545 n 8 (1965) (quoting
Edwards v South Carolina,372 US 229, 235 (1963)) (finding a "duty ... to make an independent examination of the whole record" where petitioner's First Amendment rights had
allegedly been infringed by conviction for breach of the peace); Ohio Valley Water Co. v
Ben Avon Borough, 253 US 287 (1920) (Court possesses authority to review for itself utility
rates set by state ratemaking agency where claim is raised that such rates are confiscatory).
11 See generally, Henry P. Monaghan, ConstitutionalFact Review, 85 Colum L Rev
229, 264-76 (1985); Frank R. Strong, Dilemmic Aspects of the Doctrine of "Constitutional
Fact", 47 NC L Rev 311 (1969).
" Bose Corp., 466 US at 520 (Rehnquist dissenting).
"' Bose Corp., 466 US at 514.
46 Miller v California,413 US 15, 24-25 (1973).
"1 462 US 213 (1983).
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a de novo review of a magistrate's determination that probable
cause existed for a police search. Declaring that reviewing courts
must uphold the magistrate's probable cause determination if
there is a "substantial basis" for that conclusion, the Court recognized that de novo review would likely result in police officials
turning away from the warrant procedure as the reviewing courts
set aside magistrates' determinations."
Likewise, in Dayton Board of Education v Brinkman,49 the
Court approved a decision by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals to
review under the "clearly erroneous" standard the district court's
finding on whether a school district had engaged in purposeful segregation in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, the Court appears to believe that the
mere presence of significant constitutional issues in Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection cases does not necessarily mandate
de novo review.50
The Court also rejected de novo review in favor of the "clearly
erroneous" standard in Container Corp. of America v Franchise
Tax Board.51 The Court held that the federal appellate courts
should defer to state court findings that an enterprise constitutes a
unitary business, despite the fact that this determination was
bound up in an interpretation of the limits imposed by the Commerce Clause on a state's power of taxation. The Court recognized
the problems of de novo review of a state court's finding: "It will
do the cause of legal certainty little good if this Court turns every
colorable claim that a state court erred.., into a de novo adjudication, whose unintended nuances would then52 spawn further litigation and an avalanche of critical comment.

B. Voluntariness of Confessions as a Constitutional Fact
The Court, then, has failed to provide a rational basis for distinguishing between "constitutional facts" that merit plenary federal appellate review and those that do not,53 making it quite diffi48
4,

Id at 236-37.
443 US 526 (1979).

10 See id at 534.
51 463 US 159 (1983).
" Id at 176 (footnotes omitted).
13 Most commentators who have sought to explain the Court's seemingly inconsistent
rulings have simply thrown up their hands. See Frank R. Strong, The Persistent Doctrineof
"ConstitutionalFact," 46 NC L Rev 223, 282-83 (1968); and Monaghan, 85 Colum L Rev at
264-71 (cited in note 43). Monaghan has suggested that the seemingly ad hoc basis upon
which the Court applies the constitutional fact doctrine supports discretionary de novo re-
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cult to determine what standard of review to apply to district court
determinations of the voluntariness of a confession.
In a widely cited article, Professor Henry Monaghan has formulated a theory of constitutional fact review that might provide
guidance regarding the applicability of the doctrine in the
voluntariness context. Professor Monaghan argues that plenary
federal appellate review of constitutional facts makes sense in only
two situations. The first is where there is "a need to guard against
systemic bias brought about or threatened by other actors in the
judicial system. '54 This might explain why the Court has authorized plenary review of state court findings on voluntariness, since
the Court was legitimately concerned that state courts would have
improper incentives to uphold traditional law enforcement methods against constitutional challenge. 5
Second, constitutional fact review is properly conducted where
there is a "perceived need for case-by-case development of constitutional norms." 6 For Professor Monaghan, this justification is exemplified when the Court makes an independent review of the record to more fully elaborate a constitutional standard such as the
reasonableness of a warrantless search under the Fourth Amendment. 57 Professor Monaghan concludes, however, that both justifications can be met by plenary appellate review on a discretionary
rather than mandatory basis, arguing that Bose Corp. should be
viewed as an aberration in its announcement of mandatory appellate court review of district court findings of constitutional facts. 8

view of constitutional facts by the Supreme Court and the federal circuit courts. Declaring
that the discretion to conduct an independent review of certain factual findings is essential
in shaping the outlines of a constitutional issue, he states: "the perceived need for case-bycase development of constitutional norms is likely to be the single most important trigger
for constitutional fact review.... [N]orm elaboration occurs best when the Court has power
to consider fully a series of closely related situations involving a claim of constitutional privilege." Monaghan, 85 Colum L Rev at 273 (cited in note 43).
This justification for the Court's apparent inconsistency in applying the "constitutional
fact" doctrine fails, however, to provide an adequate explanation of the actual cases. It does
not demonstrate how First Amendment protection of speech requires de novo review, while
important findings of fact involving the Fourth Amendment, on the other hand, do not. Nor
does the theory find any support in the Court's decisions themselves, which instead look to
issues such as the historical treatment of the constitutional fact by the appellate courts, see
Bose Corp., 466 US at 510, and whether de novo review at the appellate level comports with
the relative expertise of judicial actors. See Miller, 474 US at 144.
54 Monaghan, 85 Colum L Rev at 272 (cited in note 43).
55 Id.
11 Id at 273.
57 Id at 273-75.
18 Id at 264-71.
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Thus, under Professor Monaghan's analysis, it is at the very
least arguable that if the constitutional fact doctrine applies to the
voluntariness of confessions, the appellate courts have discretion to
conduct de novo constitutional review; the Supreme Court has not
expressly required them to do so. Given Professor Monaghan's justifications for the doctrine, however, there seems to be no reason
for appellate courts to apply the doctrine to review de novo district
court findings of voluntariness in habeas corpus proceedings at all.
First, there is no reason to suspect that the federal district courts
suffer from some improper bias that will lead to a distortion of a
federal right. Indeed, the Court has been content to entrust district
courts with the responsibility of determining many issues of constitutional importance.5 9 Nor would it appear that the contours of the
protection against the admission of involuntary confessions are so
vague as to require "case-by-case norm elaboration." Although
there perhaps was such a need when the Court itself established
constitutional baselines for state law enforcement methods, there
does not appear to be any present benefit from federal appellate
courts "second-guessing" district court findings on voluntariness.
Thus, the constitutional fact doctrine does not support the circuit courts of appeals that feel compelled to conduct de novo review of district court findings on the voluntariness of confessions.
At best, the doctrine might support discretionary use of the de
novo standard, and even this argument is not self-evident.
IV. APPELLATE REVIEW OF VOLUNTARINESS UNDER RULE 52
A. Fact, Law, and Confessions
If the constitutional fact doctrine does not mandate de novo
review of voluntariness at the appellate level, courts are thrown
back to a more conventional analysis of the standard of appellate
review. Central to this analysis, of course, is Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 52(a): "Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous . . . ." Thus, in reviewing findings of fact reached by the district courts, the circuit courts of appeals are bound to a narrow
scope of review and may set aside such findings only when they are
clearly erroneous or not supported by the evidence.60 Findings of
"

See text at notes 46-52.

60 See Martin B. Louis, Allocating Adjudicative Decision Making Authority Between
the Trial and Appellate Levels: A Unified View of the Scope of Review, the Judge/Jury
Question, and ProceduralDiscretion, 64 NC L Rev 993, 998-1002 (1986).
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law, however, are ordinarily reviewed without deference on appeal. 1 In order to determine whether the appellate courts must
conduct de novo review of a district court finding on the voluntariness of a petitioner's confession under Rule 52, one must decide if
the district court's findings on voluntariness should be treated as a
finding of fact or a finding of law.
The Supreme Court's decision in Miller sheds little light on
this question. While the Court identified the state court finding on
voluntariness as a "legal inquiry requiring plenary federal review," 62 it did not state explicitly that a district court finding on
this issue must be treated as a finding of law under Rule 52(a).
Indeed, the Court limited its decision to the specific question at
issue-whether state court findings on the voluntariness of a confession should be treated with deference by a reviewing federal
court.6 3 The basis for requiring federal review of the voluntariness

of confessions appears to be not so much the notion that voluntariness is a "legal" issue requiring appellate review, but that (as we
have seen above) the question involves federal rights uniquely susceptible to abuse by the states, meriting special scrutiny by the
federal courts. Yet once the need for federal review has been satisfied at the district court level, de novo review by subsequent courts
is not justifiable. Moreover, when we compare a district court's de
novo review of the voluntariness of a confession to other similar
kinds of inquiries, we see that there is no reason to categorize the
finding as anything other than a finding of "fact."
The Court has recognized that the voluntariness of a confession is in part a" 'psychological' fact"6 4 requiring investigation into
the mental state of the party who allegedly confessed voluntarily.
Thus, the inquiry into voluntariness requires the factfinder to review the factual circumstances surrounding the defendant's decision to confess in order to determine whether the defendant confessed voluntarily. The Supreme Court has designated such
investigations into an individual's state of mind as "factual" in
other settings.6 5 Moreover, the Court has indicated that such in1 Id. See also Charles Alan Wright and Arthur Miller, FederalPracticeand Procedure,

§ 2588 at 750 (West, 1971) ("[Rule 516)] is silent about legal conclusions. This silence has
been correctly interpreted as meaning that the 'clearly erroneous' instruction is not applicable and that the trial court's rulings on questions of law are reviewable without any such
limitation."); United States v Mississippi Valley Generating Co., 364 US 520, 526 (1961).
62

Miller, 474 US at 115.

63 See text at notes 29-37.
64

Culombe, 367 US at 603.

65

See, for example, Dayton Board of Education v Brinkman, 443 US 526, 534 (1979)
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quiries are most appropriately left to the lower courts, with the
appellate court conducting its own plenary review of the matter
only in the event that the lower court's finding is clearly erroneous.
In Commissioner v Duberstein,6 for example, the Court held
that the U.S. Tax Court's finding that a specific transaction was a
"gift" turned on motive and intent; the appellate court should thus
treat the finding as one of fact and review it under the "clearly
erroneous" standard. The Court observed:
The nontechnical nature of the statutory standard, the close
relationship of it to the data of practical human experience,
and the multiplicity of relevant factual elements, with their
various combinations, creating the necessity of ascribing the
proper force to each, confirm us in our conclusion that primary weight in this area must be given to the conclusions of
the trier of fact. 7
On the other hand, the Court has observed that the inquiry
into the voluntariness of a defendant's confession is not limited to
an investigation of the defendant's state of mind at the time of the
confession, but also requires the courts to examine the conditions
surrounding the defendant's confession. In particular, courts must
consider the methods used to extract the confession to determine
whether, under such ccnditions, a confession could ever be considered voluntary.6 8 While this requirement "militates against treating the question as one of simple historical fact, '6 9 it does not necessarily force the inquiry into the "law" category.
The Supreme Court has often held that the characterization of
a collectivity of historical facts should be treated as a finding of
fact for purposes of Rule 52(a). Thus, in Pullman-Standard v
Swint,7 0 the Court found that a district court's finding as to the
defendant's discrimination against the plaintiffs was a finding of

(question of purposeful segregation left to trial court); Schneckloth v Bustamonte, 412 US
218, 248-49 (1973) (question of voluntariness of consent to search left to trial court).
66 363 US 278 (1960).
11 Id at 289. The Court found that the U.S. Tax Court's expertise also supported giving
that court primary responsibility for characterizing a transaction as a "gift". Id at 291. A
similar argument might support leaving the question of voluntariness with the district
courts, since they have experience and expertise in "psychological" issues (i.e., mens rea in
criminal cases), both in instructing juries and in making such findings themselves in bench
trials.
" Miller, 474 US at 116.
69 Id.
70 456 US 273 (1982).
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fact, subject to review under the "clearly erroneous" standard. 71
While the Court characterized the question of whether the defend'72 it
ant's actions constituted discrimination as one of "pure[] fact,
is simply not a "fact" in the common understanding of that term.
The district court's finding on the question of discrimination is a
"conclusion at the end of a chain including historical facts and inferences, culminating in a characterization shaped by a rule of
law. '7 3 In considering whether a defendant has discriminated, or
whether a defendant's behavior is "reasonable, ' 74 a court must announce the proper rule of law and apply the facts to that rule. As
one circuit court has noted, "[t]he question whether a rule of law
has been violated-a question that requires applying the rule to
the facts-is normally treated as a question of fact,.., not because
it is a question of fact (it isn't) but as a way of expressing a decision to leave the answer to the trial judge or jury to make, subject
' 75
only to limited appellate review.
The district courts are particularly suited to determine the
voluntariness of a confession, since they are familiar both with the
process of making such determinations and with the applicable
constitutional principles. The Supreme Court has recognized on
many occasions the primary responsibility of the district courts in
making such factual determinations, even when this process goes
beyond simple findings about historical events, and has therefore
classified these findings as "facts" for the purpose of Rule 52(a).7 e
But our analysis of whether these findings are "facts" cannot
end here. The circuit courts' adoption of a de novo standard of
review might be supported by language in Strickland v Washington. 7 In Strickland, the Court considered an appeal from a denial
of a habeas corpus petition that contained claims of ineffectiveness
of the petitioner's counsel at trial. The Court reasoned:
Although state court findings of fact made in the course of
deciding an ineffectiveness claim are subject to the deference

7' Id at 287-88. See also Icicle Seafoods, Inc. v Worthington, 475 US 709, 714 (1986)
(question of whether an individual falls into the statutory definition of a "seaman" is a
question of fact, reviewable under the "clearly erroneous" standard).
72 Pullman-Standard,456 US at 288.
7' Sotelo, 850 F2d at 1254 (Easterbrook concurring).
14 Monaghan, 85 Colum L Rev at 234 n 33 (cited in note 43).
71 Davenport v DeRobertis, 844 F2d 1310, 1311-12 (7th Cir 1988) (emphasis in original).
See also Sotelo, 850 F2d at 1254-55 (Easterbrook concurring).
71 See, for example, Pullman-Standard v Swint, 456 US 273 (1982); Duberstein v
United States, 363 US 278 (1960); Illinois v Gates, 462 US 213 (1983).
77 466 US 668 (1984).
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requirement of § 2254(d), and although district court findings
are subject to the clearly erroneous standard of Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 52(a), both the performance and prejudice
components of the ineffectiveness inquiry are mixed questions
of law and fact. 8
One could infer from the Court's language that, in habeas
cases, the relationship of the federal appellate courts to the federal
district courts under Rule 52(a) must parallel the relationship of
the federal district courts to the state courts under § 2254(d). In
other words, what is reviewable as a "mixed question of law and
fact" under § 2254(d) should also be reviewable de novo by a federal appellate court under Rule 52(a). 7 However, the question in
Strickland, like that in Miller, was the appropriate level of deference to state court findings by the federal courts, not the deference
due the district courts by the federal appellate courts.
Judge Posner, for one, has challenged the suggestion that categories of "law" and "fact" are identical under Rule 52(a) and
§2254(d). He argues that designations of "law" and "fact" by
courts are not fixed, pre-existing categories, but are the product of
"policy-grounded legal conclusions."8 0 Granting that under Miller
the district courts must treat state court findings on the voluntariness of a defendant's confession as a finding of law under §
2254(d), and hence give it plenary review, Judge Posner states:
For purposes of appellate review, however, the issue might be
one of fact. It is nowhere written that the law-fact distinction
must be treated the same in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) and in
Fed.R.Civ. P. 52(a).... We ought to ask what is gained and
what lost by appellate second-guessing of a federal district
judge's determination that a state criminal defendant's confession was voluntary. 81
The Court in Miller also emphasized that the fact/law distinction
is not a clear or fixed determination. Rather, the Court looked to
the purposes served by de novo federal court review of
voluntariness.8 2
Id at 698.
"' While the proper standard for appellate review of "mixed questions of law and fact"
is not clear, the Court has upheld de novo appellate review in several cases. See, for example,Bogardus v Commissioner,302 US 34, 39 (1937) (quoting Helvering v Tex-Penn Oil Co.,
300 US 481, 491 (1937)) ("[A] determination of a mixed question of law and fact ... is
78

subject to ... review . .

").

10 Weidner v Thieret, 866 F2d 958, 961 (7th Cir 1989).
81 Id.

82 Miller, 474 US at 114-15.
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B. Fact, Law, and Efficiency
Judge Posner's comments invite federal appellate courts to reexamine their practice of conducting de novo review of district
court findings on the voluntariness of state defendants' confessions
in light of the costs and benefits of such a rule. His suggestion accords with much of the Supreme Court's recent jurisprudence on
the proper scope of appellate review of district court findings. Although admitting that the decision to designate an issue as one of
"law" or "fact" for purposes of the proper scope of appellate review is unclear at best,8 3 the Court has in several recent cases
looked to the effect that the designation of a finding as "law" or as
"fact" would have on judicial efficiency. In Anderson v Bessemer
City,84 for example, the Court reversed a Fourth Circuit decision
and held that a finding of discrimination was a "finding of fact"
under Rule 52(a). The Court observed:
The rationale for deference to the original finder of fact is not
limited to the superiority of the trial judge's position to make
determinations of credibility. . . . Duplication of the trial
judge's efforts in the court of appeals would very likely contribute only negligibly to the accuracy of fact determination at
a huge cost in diversion of judicial resources. In addition, the
parties to a case on appeal have already been forced to concentrate their energies and resources on persuading the trial
judge that their account of the facts is the correct one; requiring them to persuade three more judges at the appellate level
is requiring too much. 5
The Court's explicit recognition of the relevance of judicial efficiency in determining which findings should be treated as "findings of law" and which as "findings of fact" 86 makes it appropriate
to consider judicial review of the voluntariness question from this
perspective. Both parts of the voluntariness inquiry's two-pronged
test-whether a defendant's will was actually overborne and
whether a state's methods comply with due process-are rooted in
" See Pullman-Standard,456 US at 288; and Miller, 474 US at 113.

8'470 US 564 (1985).
85Id at 574-75.

86 See Miller, 474 US at 114 ("[T]he fact/law distinction at times has turned on a determination that, as a matter of the sound administration of justice, one judicial actor is
better positioned than another to decide the issue in question.").
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the basic circumstances of the particular case under consideration.
Requiring de novo review of this process forces the appellate
courts to duplicate the efforts of the lower courts. What, if anything, would be gained by requiring courts to go through such an
apparently redundant enterprise?
One response to this question is that a certain redundancy already exists within a system permitting federal review of state
court decisions,8 7 and thus federal habeas corpus law itself sanctions a certain amount of duplicative judicial review. The answer
to this argument, contained in the Court's opinion in Miller, is
that the defendant has a federal constitutional right to make an
unconstrained decision to confess. Consequently, the Court has allowed federal de novo review of state court findings only in instances where the federal courts possess a substantial advantage
over their state court counterparts due to their familiarity with
(and faithful application of) the constitutional principles that determine whether the state respected the defendant's due process
rights.88 Certainly, an argument giving primary authority to the judicial actor best-suited to perform a task does not require federal
appellate courts to conduct de novo review of district court findings. As courts of original jurisdiction in matters of federal law,
including constitutional claims, district courts are expert in reviewing historical facts for issues of federal constitutional importance.
The circuit courts do not possess any obvious advantage over the
district courts in matters requiring the application of federal constitutional principles.
Indeed, unlike the district courts, which have expertise in factual determinations, the appellate courts may actually be at a disadvantage in making such determinations. In cases such as Duberstein, the Court has recognized that trial courts are better suited
to conduct inquiries into an individual's state of mind and the status of individual actions under the law.89 District courts regularly
establish basic historical facts and apply the law to this set of
facts.90 De novo review requires the district court to conduct an

Id at 118-19 (Rehnquist dissenting).
88 Id at 117. The Court observed that while state courts have an advantage over the
reviewing federal court in determining historical facts, "once ... the moment comes for determining whether ... the confession was obtained in a manner consistent with the Constitution, the state-court judge is not in an appreciably better position than the federal habeas
court to make that determination."
8" Duberstein, 363 US at 289-90.
80 In cases arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 USC § 2000 et seq, for
example, a district court will establish the facts surrounding the allegedly discriminatory
87
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independent "trial" based on the state court record and any additional evidence it chooses to take.91 District courts are thus wellsuited to the task of reviewing the state court record de novo and
reaching an independent finding as to the voluntariness of a
confession.
For an appellate court, on the other hand, de novo review of
the voluntariness of a confession represents a substantial departure from its traditional role. Constrained by the terms of Rule
52(a), federal appellate courts are largely confined to reviewing
lower court "findings of law" and correcting misstatements of the
law made by the lower courts in either their findings or their instructions to juries." This allocation of responsibility promotes judicial efficiency within the federal system9 3 and prevents litigants
from receiving differing treatment of their claims depending on the
identity of the court hearing their case. Federal appellate courts
thus conserve judicial resources and enhance the uniformity of the
law. Requiring appellate courts to conduct a de novo examination
of the voluntariness of a confession forces them to "root about in
the record" to make a factual determination, a practice outside
their ordinary functions.94
Little would be gained through appellate court de novo review
of the voluntariness of a confession on an appeal from a habeas
corpus petition. Merely recognizing that voluntariness is an important constitutional right does not justify an additional layer of de
novo review unless such review will increase the possibility of
reaching the correct outcome. Although the appellate court might
reverse an incorrect finding by the district court, it seems just as
likely that it will err in admitting a coerced confession, or that it
will mistakenly overturn a conviction by finding that the confesaction and declare whether such facts constitute "discrimination" under Title VII.
91 The federal habeus corpus statute permits the district court to hold and "evidentiary
hearing" when necessary. 28 USC § 2254(d) (1982). See also Townsend v Sain, 372 US 293
(1963).
92 The chief exception to this narrow scope of review, of course, is the constitutional
fact doctrine, discussed in text at notes 39-52.
"3The federal court system represents a division of labor based on the principle of
comparative advantage. The trial judges are better at making factual determinations, while
appellate judges are better at making abstract determinations. Dividing the system into two
parts enhances the accuracy of both. As one court has noted, the "main responsibility [of an
appellate court] is to maintain the uniformity and coherence of the law." Mucha v King, 792
F2d 602, 605-06 (7th Cir 1986).
" See Sotelo, 850 F2d at 1254 (Easterbrook concurring) ("[R]equiring three appellate
judges to root about in the record and come up with their independent characterizations
and inferences... asks of them what they do least well, while diverting time from functions
at the core of their duties.").
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sion was coerced when it was in reality freely given. Indeed, after
de novo consideration of the record surrounding the confession, the
district court and appellate courts may come to equally defensible,
but opposing viewpoints. 5 In the absence of any special expertise
that would justify independent review, de novo review by the appellate court appears to add nothing except the time of three more
judicial actors who could just as likely reach the wrong result as
the district court judge.
A more appropriate function for the appellate courts in reviewing habeas corpus petitions would be to ensure that the standards used by the lower courts are correct and uniform throughout
the circuit. Thus, a circuit court must ensure that the district court
finding on voluntariness did not look into the state of mind of the
petitioner alone, but also examined the methods employed by law
enforcement officials. If not, the circlit court should remand the
case to the district court with instructions to consider the methods
used by the state to extract the confession.9 6 Additionally, the circuit courts retain their ability to review and reverse district court
findings of fact that are "clearly erroneous." Thus, if the evidence
clearly demonstrates that the state's methods for extracting the
defendant's confession overwhelmed his will, and yet the district
court found otherwise, the circuit court should reverse. 9 By focusing their attention on questions of law, the circuit courts can simultaneously fulfill their proper role within the federal judiciary
and promote a more efficient judicial system.
C. Congressional Recognition of the Importance of Efficiency in
Habeas Corpus Proceedings
The discussion thus far has suggested that plenary appellate
review of the voluntariness question is neither mandated nor useful in direct appeals or in habeas cases. In Miller, the Court expressed a need for plenary federal review of the voluntariness issue
Il The Court has noted that there is little to be gained by de novo review of a set of
facts that permit two defensible readings. Anderson, 470 US at 573-74. See also United
States v Yellow Cab Co., 338 US 338, 342 (1949).
96 See Kelly v Southern Pacific Co., 419 US 318, 331-32 (1974) (the proper role of the
circuit courts when the district court applies an incorrect legal standard is to remand for a
re-examination of the record in light of the proper legal standard). See also Pullman-Standard, 456 US at 287.
" See, for example, Davis v North Carolina,384 US 737 (1966) (oral and written confession ruled inadmissible where the defendant, a poor man with a fourth grade education,
was interrogated over a period of 16 days without any notification of his rights, and was
informed that he had no right to use the telephone or see anyone).
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in habeas cases. Once this need is satisfied by proper district court
de novo review, the appellate court should use standard Rule 52(a)
analysis to determine whether it, too, should review the question
de novo. As part of this analysis, the court should recognize that
stronger reasons exist in the habeas context than in direct appeals
to refrain from conducting de novo appellate review. In addition to
the obvious duplication of both the district and state courts' efforts, the appellate court should consider the intent behind Congress's most recent amendment to the Habeas Corpus Act limiting
the power of federal courts to review findings of fact by the state
courts.
The 1966 amendment, which limited federal court discretion
to disturb state court findings in habeas proceedings, appears to
have been driven by legislative and judicial recognition that the
number of applications by state prisoners for writs of habeas
corpus had been increasing at an extremely rapid pace."' Comment
on the legislation is scarce, but there are indications that Congress
intended to make federal court review of habeas corpus petitions
more efficient. Judge Orie Phillips of the Tenth Circuit, then
Chairman of the Judicial Conference Habeas Corpus Committee,
observed: "The purpose of [the legislation] . . . is to prevent the
abuse of the writ of habeas corpus by persons in custody under
judgments of State courts. .. ."I' This objective accorded with the
Supreme Court's stated desire to prevent habeas corpus proceedings from "swamp[ing] the dockets of the District Courts."'' 0
The amendment seems to have slowed the growth in the number of habeas corpus petitions filed by state prisoners in the district courts.' But if Congress thereby eased the district courts'
burden, it did not slow the rise in the number of appeals from
these district court decisions filed in the circuit courts. From 1977
to 1982, the number of appeals of district court decisions in habeas
corpus proceedings grew from 712 to 1529, a 114.7 percent
0 2
increase.1
Il The number of applications received by the district courts had risen dramatically in
the three years prior to passage of the 1966 amendment, from approximately 1700 applications in 1963 to well over 3200 in 1964, and more than 4800 in 1965. Habeas Corpus-State
Custody, S Rep No 89-1797, 89th Cong, 2d Sess 1 (1966).

99 Id at 4.

Townsend, 372 US at 319.
"01Although no research has correlated the two events, the number of habeas filings by
100

state prisoners levelled off in the late 1960s and early 1970s. See Department of Justice,
Federal Review of State PrisonerPetitions: Habeas Corpus 2 (1984).
102 Id at 4. Statistical data further shows that over 26 percent of all state prisoner
habeas corpus cases filed in district court were appealed to the federal circuit courts, with
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Accompanying this rise in the number of appeals of district
court habeas corpus decisions has been an increase in the level of
01 Yet, at a time
judicial resources needed to process these appeals.0
when limited judicial resources must accommodate an ever greater
number of appeals, the federal appellate courts have bound themselves to conduct de novo review of the voluntariness of a defendant's confession whenever the defendant alleges that it was obtained involuntarily. This review duplicates the efforts undertaken
by both the state courts and the federal district court.
Because most habeas corpus petitions contain multiple allegations of illegal imprisonment, it is somewhat difficult to accurately
determine the number of habeas corpus petitions based on allegedly involuntary confessions. What little data there is suggests that
just over five percent of all habeas corpus petitions filed in the district courts contain claims of allegedly involuntary confessions. 0 4
One might argue that if involuntary confession claims account for
such a small percentage of the overall number of claims in habeas
corpus petitions, the "wasted" judicial resources resulting from de
novo appellate review is inconsequential.
Yet the de novo review that the circuit courts conduct requires
an examination of both the district court record and the state trial
court record to determine whether the confession at issue was indeed voluntary. The process is essentially a "re-trial" of the voluntariness question based upon the appellate court's own examination of the record. Thus, de novo review requires a substantial
expenditure of judicial resources in each particular case. Moreover,
no expenditure of judicial resources is inconsequential when both
the federal district and appellate courts are "already heavily
burdened." 10 5

an average period of 10.4 months between filing a notice of appeal and the appellate court
decision. Id at 7. For a general statistical survey of habeas corpus state prisoner petitions,
see Paul H. Robinson, An Empirical Study of Federal Habeas Corpus Review of State
Court Judgments (DOJ, 1979).

"I'Justice Department statistics show that a growing backlog of habeas corpus cases
exists in the appellate courts. The Justice Department offers no explanation for this increase. See Department of Justice, Federal Review of State PrisonerPetitions at 7 (cited in
note 101).
,01
Robinson, An EmpiricalStudy of FederalHabeas Corpus at 12 (cited in note 102).
oI United States v Peltier, 422 US 531, 560 (1975) (Brennan dissenting). For other

statements concerning the growing burden on the federal system, see American Law Institute, Proceedings of the 49th Annual Meeting 25-27 (1972) (opening remarks of former

Chief Justice Warren E. Burger); and Warren E. Burger, Annual Report on the State of the
Judiciary 5 (American Bar Association, 1980).
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In adopting the 1966 amendments, Congress understood the
importance of judicial efficiency in reviewing habeas corpus petitions. Congress recognized that although habeas corpus was essential for the protection of federal rights, it could not be allowed to
overwhelm the federal court system. 106 Miller was silent on the issue of the appropriate standard of federal appellate court review of
the voluntariness of confessions, leaving the circuit courts without
a clear mandate. In the absence of such a mandate, and given the
Court's explicit recognition that it is appropriate to consider the
efficient allocation of judicial resources in determining the proper
standard of review under Rule 52(a), 10 the appellate courts should
acknowledge Congress's emphasis on judicial efficiency. Such emphasis provides a clear standard of deference for federal appellate
review of district court findings on the voluntariness of confessions.
CONCLUSION

The circuit courts of appeals have bound themselves to conducting de novo review of district court findings on the voluntariness of a confession in habeas corpus proceedings. The unanimity
of the circuit courts is not simple wrong-headedness, but rather a
reasonable interpretation of both the Supreme Court habeas
corpus decisions and its inconsistent holdings on the proper scope
of federal appellate review of factual determinations that involve
constitutional issues. Yet, in the absence of any statutory directive
or Supreme Court decision to the contrary, the circuit courts of
appeals remain free to re-evaluate their current position. For several reasons, it would be wise for them to do so.
As the Court has noted, the decision as to the proper standard
of appellate review of lower court findings "has turned on a determination that, as a matter of the sound administration of justice,
one judicial actor is better positioned than another to decide the
issue in question."' 1 8 It is precisely concern for the "sound administration of justice," both in terms of simple efficiency and ensuring that the judicial actor best suited to ascertaining facts and determining individual legal rights has the authority to do so, that
point in the direction of giving the district court primary responsi10 See S Rep No 89-1797 at 1-2 (cited in note 98) ("The number of applications by
State prisoners for writs of habeas corpus has been steadily increasing .... [T]he applications in their totality have imposed a heavy burden on the Federal courts."). See also Townsend, 372 US at 319 ("[T]he too promiscuous grant of evidentiary hearings on habeas
could . .. swamp [district court] dockets .... ).
207 See Anderson, 470 US at 574-75; and Miller, 474 US at 114.
108Miller, 474 US at 114.
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bility for voluntariness decisions in a habeas corpus proceeding. By
adopting the "clearly erroneous" standard, the circuit courts could
abandon a rule that ignores the growing burden of habeas corpus
appeals, strong congressional concerns for promoting efficient consideration of habeas corpus petitions, and clear advantages in judicial efficiency. It is a change that circuit courts cannot and should
not rely on the Supreme Court to make for them.

